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Abstract
There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalisations of clas-
sic incompleteness results. This paper provides evidence that such gen-
eralisations are readibly obtainable from suitably hierarchical versions of
the principles used in the original proof. By collecting such principles, we
prove hierarchical versions of Mostowski’s theorem on independent for-
mulae, Kripke’s theorem on flexible formulae, and a number of further
generalisations thereof. As a corollary, we obtain the expected result that
the formula expressing “T is Σn-ill” is a canonical example of a Σn+1
formula that is Πn+1-conservative over T.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalisations of classic in-
completeness results [4, 20, 23, 35]. A sample result, generalising Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem, and independently proved in both [20] and [35], is:
Theorem 1. Let T be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound extension of PA. Then there
is a Πn+1-sentence that is undecidable in T.
In this paper I argue that such hierarchical generalisations can often be
obtained from the original proofs by replacing certain principles used in the
proofs by appropriately formulated hierarchical versions, while the essence of
the arguments remain the same. The hierarchical principles, once appropriately
formulated, are in turn often provable by appropriate generalisations of the core
concepts employed in the proofs of the ordinary ones, but even so, there is no
single source to which to turn for them. Both Smoryn´ski [39] and Beklemi-
shev [1] give good partial accounts of the syntactical side, and Poizat [31] gives
a hierarchical perspective on the basic model theory of arithmetic, including
∗This paper is based on a cross section of the author’s doctoral thesis [2]: in particular,
the Corollary to Theorem 3 (with a different proof), and what is essentially Theorem 4 have
already appeared there. I am grateful to Ali Enayat, Joel Hamkins, and Volodya Shavrukov
for inspiration, discussion, and guidance.
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model-theoretic proofs of hierarchical versions of Go¨del’s first and second in-
completeness theorems. Still, I find certain aspects lacking. With this in mind,
one aim of this paper is to collect a number of principles that may be useful
to the reader who herself wishes to prove hierarchical incompleteness results
without having to reinvent the wheel.
These principles are then put to use to prove a number of general incom-
pleteness results for arithmetically definable fragments of PA. The goal is not
to prove the sharpest or most general results (in fact some of the results follow
from each other), but rather to exemplify how the hierarchical principles enter
into more or less well-known proof methods. Even so, the results presented
here improve on some results of Chao and Seraji [4], Kikuchi and Kurahashi
[20], and Salehi and Seraji [35], and sharpen some of Blanck [2], Hamkins [17],
and Lindstro¨m [24]. These sharpenings are in terms of gauging the amount of
induction needed for the proofs, bringing the (in this particular sub-field largely
ignored) fragments-of-arithmetic perspective to attention.
2 Notation and conventions
Let the arithmetical hierarchy be defined as usual. Bn is the collection of
Boolean combinations of Σn formulae, and ∆n(M) is the set of Σn formu-
lae that are equivalent to Πn formulae in some model M. When writing ∆n,
we mean ∆n(N). Throughout the paper Γ denotes either Σn or Πn, for n > 0.
If φ(x) is any formula, pφ(x)q denotes the numeral for the Go¨del number
of φ(x) under some fixed Go¨del numbering, but we make no typographical dis-
tinction between natural numbers and the corresponding numerals. We use
Feferman’s dot notation pφ(x˙)q to represent the Go¨del number of the sentence
obtained by replacing the variable x with the actual value of x; hence x is free
in pφ(x˙)q. The notation := is used to express equality between formulae. Let
⊤ := 0 = 0 and ⊥ := ¬⊤. Let φ0 := φ and φ1 := ¬φ. The notation ∃!xφ(x) is
used as shorthand for ∃x(φ(x) ∧ ∀y(φ(y)→ x = y)).
T is Γ-sound iff for all γ ∈ Γ, if T ⊢ γ then N |= γ. The other direction is
sometimes known as Γ-completeness: hence T is Γ-complete iff for all γ ∈ Γ, if
N |= γ, then T ⊢ γ.
A relation is numerated in T by a formula φ iff X = {〈k1, . . . , kn〉 ∈ ω
n :
T ⊢ φ(k1, . . . , kn)}, and binumerated by φ in T if ¬φ also numerates the com-
plement of X . A function f is strongly representable in T iff there is a for-
mula φ(x1, . . . , xn, y) that binumerates f(x1, . . . , xn) = y in T, and moreover,
if f(k1, . . . , kn) = m, then T ⊢ ∀y(φ(k1, . . . , kn, y)→ y = m).
Given a formula τ(x), let Prfτ (x, y) be a formula expressing “y is a proof
of the sentence x from the set of sentences satisfying τ(z)”; this formula can
be defined to have the same complexity as τ(z). Let Prτ (x) be the formula
∃yPrfτ (x, y), and let Conτ be the sentence ¬Prτ (⊥). Whenever τ(z) is Σn+1,
the same holds true for Prτ (x), while Conτ is Πn+1. When T is Σn+1-definable,
we write PrT(x), etc., instead of Prσ(x) for some fixed Σn+1-definition σ(x) of
T.
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Models of arithmetic are denoted M, etc., while the respective domains are
denoted M , etc. The standard model is denoted N. If M is non-standard, the
standard system ofM, SSy(M), is the collection of of sets X ⊆ ω such that for
some a ∈ M , X = {n ∈ ω : M |= nǫa}, where ǫ is Ackermann’s membership
relation expressing “the nth bit of the binary expansion of a is 1”. Then X is
coded in M, and a is a code for X .
Let Y be a set of formulae. A relation X is Y -definable in M iff there
is a formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Y such that X = {〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 ∈ Mn : M |=
φ(m0, . . . ,mn)}. When writing Y -definable without any qualification, Y -defin-
ability in N is assumed.
If Y is a set of sentences, then ThY (M) is the set of Y -sentences true inM,
that is, the set {φ ∈ Y :M |= φ}. If M is a submodel of N and for all a ∈ M
and γ(x) ∈ Γ, M |= γ(a) iff N |= γ(a), then N is a Γ-elementary extension of
M. IfM |= σ for some Σn+1 sentence σ, and N is a Σn-elementary extension of
M, then N |= σ. N is an end-extension of M (or, equivalently, M is an initial
segment of N ) iff M is a submodel of N , and whenever a ∈M and b ∈ N , and
N |= b < a, then b ∈M .
Let ∅(n) denote the nth Turing jump of the empty set (see, e.g. Rogers [34,
p. 254]). For each n, let 〈ϕni : i ∈ ω〉 be an acceptable (in the sense of [34,
Excercise 2.10]) enumeration of the functions that are partial recursive in ∅(n);
these are the n-recursive functions. For each partial n-recursive function ϕne , let
the eth n-r.e. set Wne be the domain of ϕ
n
e . If f is a function such that f ≃ ϕ
n
e
for some e, then e is an n-index for f .
We assume that all theories denoted T, etc., are consistent, arithmetically
definable, extensions of Q in the same language. IΣn is the theory obtained by
adding induction for Σn formulae to Q, while I∆0+exp is Q plus ∆0-induction
plus an axiom stating that the exponentiation function is total.
3 Preliminary principles
This section collects a number of hierarchically formulated principles that are
useful to prove hierarchical incompleteness results of the kind given in Theo-
rem 1. None of the principles should come as a surprise, and with the possible
exception of Fact 13, they can all be found scattered across the literature.
The first thing to make sure when attempting to generalise to hierarchies
is that the ordinary, non-hierarchical statement fits nicely into the hierarchical
one. The first fact, consisting of three observations (see, e.g. Beklemishev [1,
Lemma 2.9], Ha´jek [15, Lemma 2.2], Smoryn´ski [37, Lemma 0.3]), suggest what
the basis should be.
Fact 1.
1. T is Σn-sound iff T is Πn+1-sound iff T + ThΣn+1(N) is consistent.
2. T is Πn-complete iff T is Σn+1-complete.
3. T is consistent iff T is Σ0-sound.
3
Fact 2 (Generalised Craig’s trick). Every Σn+1-definable theory has a deduc-
tively equivalent Πn-definition.
Bibliographical remark. Craig’s [7] formulation pertains to r.e. theories having
deductively equivalent primitive recursive definitions. The hierarchical general-
isation is due to Grzegorczyk et al. [13, 2.2.C].
From these first two facts, we see that the ordinary formulation “r.e., con-
sistent” can be rephrased as “Σ1-definable, Σ0-sound”, thereby establishing the
base level of the hierarchy. Therefore, Theorem 1 for n = 0 is precisely the
Go¨del-Rosser incompleteness theorem.
Fact 3 (Post’s theorem [32], cf. Rogers [34, Theorem 14.VIII]).
1. A set is Σn+1 iff it is r.e. in ∅(n).
2. Every Σn set is Turing reducible to ∅(n).
Fact 4.
1. A set is Γ-definable iff it is numerated by a Γ formula in Q + ThΓ(N).
2. A set is Σn- (or Πn-) definable iff it is binumerated by a Σn (or Πn)
formula in Q + ThBn(N).
3. A function is recursive in ∅(n) iff it is strongly representable in Q +
ThBn(N).
This fact is the counterpart of the famous observation that all r.e. sets can
be represented in Q. The first two items are immediately seen to be true, while
the third follows from Fact 3 together with the observation that ThBn(N) is
recursive in ∅(n), Σn+1-complete, and Πn+1-sound.
Fact 5 (The parametric diagonal lemma). For every Γ formula γ(x, y), we can
effectively find a Γ formula ξ(x) such that
Q ⊢ ∀x(ξ(x) ↔ γ(x, pξq)).
Bibliographical remark. This form of the diagonal lemma is essentially due to
Montague [28, Lemma 1]. The proof by Ehrenfeucht and Feferman [9, Lemma 1]
of a weaker result actually suffices to prove the above; see also Smoryn´ski [38]
for a discussion of the development of the diagonal lemma.
Fact 6 (Partial satisfaction predicates). For each k and Γ, there is a k + 1-ary
Γ formula SatΓ(x, x1, . . . , xk) such that for every Γ-formula φ(x1, . . . , xk),
I∆0 + exp ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xk(φ(x1, . . . , xk)↔ SatΓ(pφq, x1, . . . , xk)).
Hence there is also a Γ formula TrΓ(x) such that for every Γ sentence φ,
I∆0 + exp ⊢ φ↔ TrΓ(pφq).
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Bibliographical remark. The use of partial satisfaction predicates goes back to
Hilbert and Bernays [18]. Modern proofs can be found in [19] and [16].
The next fact also has its roots with Hilbert and Bernays [18]; see also
Feferman [10, Lemma 3.10] and Beklemishev [1, Proposition 2.11]. Let PrT,Γ(x)
be the formula ∃y ∈ Γ(TrΓ(y) ∧ PrT+y(x)), and let ConT,Γ be ¬PrT,Γ(⊥).
Fact 7 (Provable Γ-completeness). Let σ(x1, . . . , xn) be any Γ formula. Then
I∆0 + exp ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xn(σ(x1, . . . , xn)→ PrT,Γ(pσ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)q)).
The provability predicates are subject to the following very useful conditions;
they originate with Hilbert and Bernays [18], subsequently refined by Lo¨b [27].
For the hierarchical versions presented here, see Smoryn´ski [39, Lemma 3.3.7],
Beklemishev [1, Proposition 2.10].
Fact 8 (Lo¨b conditions in I∆0 + exp). Let X be any set of Γ sentences such
that T +X is consistent. Then for all sentences φ, ψ,
1. if T +X ⊢ φ, then I∆0 + exp +X ⊢ PrT,Γ(pφq);
2. I∆0 + exp ⊢ PrT,Γ(pφq) ∧ PrT,Γ(pφ→ ψq)→ PrT,Γ(pψq);
3. I∆0 + exp ⊢ PrT,Γ(pφq)→ PrT,Γ(pPrT,Γ(φ)q).
Similar statements also hold for formulae with free variables.
Let PrkT,Γ(pφ(x˙)q) be the Γ formula
∃yz ≤ k(y ∈ Γ ∧ TrΓ(y) ∧ PrfT+y(x, z)).
Fact 9 (Small reflection). Let T be a consistent extension of Q, and let φ(x)
be any formula. We have:
I∆0 + exp ⊢ ∀z(PrT(p∀x(Pr
z
T,Γ(φ(x))→ φ(x)))q).
Bibliographical remark. A forerunner to this reflection principle is proved in Fe-
ferman [11, Lemma 2.18]. Verbrugge and Visser [40] show how that principle
can be formalised in (theories weaker than) I∆0 + exp. The hierarchical gener-
alisation is straightforward; see also Ha´jek and Pudla´k [16, Lemma III.4.40].
Fact 10 (Refined arithmetical completeness theorem). Let M be a model of
IΣn+1. If T is a Σn+1(M)-definable theory such thatM |= ConT, then there is
an end-extension of M satisfying T.
Bibliographical remark. This fact is a merge of Cornaros and Dimitracopoulos’s
[6, Theorem 4] refinement of Paris’s [30, Lemma 1] version of the arithmetised
completeness theorem, and the low arithmetised completeness theorem [16, The-
orem I.4.27].
Fact 11. IfM is a non-standard model of IΣn, and φ(x) is a Σn formula, then
{k ∈ ω :M |= φ(k)} is coded in M.
5
Fact 12 (Refined Friedman embedding theorem). If M and N are countable
non-standard models of IΣn+1 then the following are equivalent:
1. M is embeddable as a Σn-elementary initial segment of N ;
2. SSy(M) = SSy(N ) and ThΣn+1(M) ⊆ ThΣn+1(N ).
Bibliographical remark. This refinement of Friedman’s [12] embedding theorem
is due to Ressayre [33, Theorem 1.I] and Dimitracopoulous and Paris [8, Corol-
lary 2.4], independently. The hierarchical generalisation is straightforward, and
has been worked out by Cornaros [5, Corollary 15].
The next fact is an excerpt of a generalisation of the Orey-Ha´jek-Guaspari-
Lindstro¨m characterisation of interpretability. For extensions of PA, the equiv-
alence of (1) and (3) is due to Guaspari [14, Theorem 6.5(i)]. The equivalence
of (1) and (2) for finitely axiomatisable theories seems to have been known to
experts for some time, while the equivalence of (2) and (3) for r.e. fragments of
PA is found in [3, Theorem 2.11]. The generalisation to Σn+1-definable theories
present no further difficulties.
Fact 13 (OHGL characterisation). Let S and T be consistent, Σn+1-definable
extensions of IΣn+1. The following are equivalent:
1. S is Πn+1-conservative over T;
2. for all k ∈ ω, T ⊢ ConkS,Σn+1;
3. every countable model M of T with S ∈ SSy(M) has a Σn-elementary
extension to a model of S;
The last part of this section is devoted to some standard results from recur-
sion theory, and their relationship to the type of arithmetised metamathematics
as developed above. A good source for the next three facts is Kleene [21] The-
orems XXVII, IV, and XXII, respectively.
Fact 14 (The recursion theorem). Let f(z, x1, . . . , xn) be any partial n-recursive
function. There is an n-index e such that
ϕne (x1, . . . , xn) ≃ f(e, x1, . . . , xn).
The recursion theorem can be formalised in I∆0 + exp using the diagonal
lemma [39, Theorem 0.6.12], [26, Section 1.2]. If the resulting n-recursive func-
tion is total, this can be proved in IΣn+1 [39, pp. 155-156].
Fact 15 (The normal form theorem). Every Σn+1-definable set can be defined
by a Σn+1 formula on Kleene normal form: ∃y1∀y2 . . .Qn+1T (i, x, y1, . . . , yn))
for a suitable choice of i. Here T is Kleene’s primitive recursive T -predicate, Q
is ∃ or ∀ depending on whether n+ 1 is odd or even, and in the latter case, T
is prefixed by a negation symbol.
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Fact 16 (The enumeration theorem). For each n, there is an n-recursive func-
tion that is universal for n-recursive functions, that is, a function Φn(x, y) such
that for each n-recursive function f with index e, Φn(e, y) = z iff f(y) = z.
By Facts 3 and 4, there is a Σn+1 formula R
n(x, y, z) binumerating the
relation Φn(x, y) = z in Q+ThBn(N). In certain cases we can assume that this
representation has particularly nice properties, using the following result which
is taken from Smoryn´ski [39, Theorem 0.6.9] for the case n = 0. The hierarchical
generalisation given here is supposedly folklore, and in any case, easy to prove
using Smoryn´ski’s argument.
Fact 17 (The selection theorem). For each Σn+1-formula φ with exactly the
variables x1, . . . , xk free, there is a Σn+1-formula Sel{φ} with exactly the same
free variables, such that:
1. IΣn ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xk(Sel{φ}(x1, . . . , xk)→ φ(x1, . . . , xk));
2. IΣn ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xk, y(Sel{φ}(x1, . . . , xk)∧
Sel{φ}(x1, . . . , xk−1, y)→ xk = y);
3. IΣn ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xk−1(∃xkφ(x1, . . . , xk)→ ∃xkSel{φ}(x1, . . . , xk)).
These formulae are useful in that they can be used in combination with par-
tial satisfaction predicates to strongly represent n-recursive functions in exten-
sions of IΣn+ThBn(N), by instead letting ϕe be the n-recursive function whose
graph is defined by Sel{SatΣn+1}(e, y1, . . . , yk, z) in N. The resulting enumera-
tion is acceptable in Rogers’s sense, so whenever convenient, it can without loss
of generality be assumed that
Rn(x, y1, . . . , yk, z) := Sel{SatΣn+1}(x, y1, . . . , yk, z).
4 Applications
The goal of this section is to prove a handful of hierarchical incompleteness
results, using the tools we reviewed in the previous one. The first such result
stems from Mostowski [29, Theorem 2], who proved that whenever 〈Ti : i ∈ ω〉 is
an r.e. family of consistent, r.e. theories extending Q, then there is a Π1 formula
that is simultaneously independent over these theories. Here, we understand
the concept of an independent formula in the following way:
Definition. A formula ξ(x) is independent over T if, for every f : ω → {0, 1},
the theory T + {ξ(n)f(n)} is consistent, where φ0 = φ and φ1 = ¬φ.
While one of Mostowski’s accomplishments was the simultaneous indepen-
dence over a whole r.e. family of theories, this aspect of his result is deliberately
ignored here. Instead, we focus on how to construct formulae independent over
Σn+1-definable theories. Note the striking similarity with the statement of The-
orem 1.
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Theorem 2. Let T be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound extension of Q. Then there
is a Σn+1 formula ξ(x) that is independent over T.
Proof. Define a function f(x) by the stipulation that f(m) = k iff
T ⊢ ¬(Rn(m,m, k) ∧ ∃!zRn(m,m, z)).
Since T is Σn+1-definable, the relation f(x) = y is Σn+1, and therefore f is
recursive in ∅(n) by Fact 3. Let, by Fact 16, e be an n-index for f , and let
ξ(x) be the Σn+1 formula ∃z(Rn(e, e, z) ∧ ∃yT (z, x, y)), where T is Kleene’s
T -predicate.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that T+Rn(e, e, k)∧∃!zR(e, e, z) is inconsistent
for some k ∈ ω. Then T ⊢ ¬(Rn(e, e, k)∧∃!zR(e, e, z)), so f(e) = k by definition.
But then T+ThΣn+1(N) ⊢ R
n(e, e, k)∧∃!zRn(e, e, z) by Fact 4, so T+ThΣn+1(N)
is inconsistent, which by Fact 1 contradicts the assumption that T is Σn-sound.
Hence the theory T + Rn(e, e, k) ∧ ∃!zR(e, e, z) is consistent for any choice of
k ∈ ω.
Let g be any function from ω to {0, 1} and let X = {ξ(k)g(k) : k ∈ ω}. Let
Y be any finite subset of X , and let Z be the set {k : ξ(k) ∈ Y }. By Fact 15,
there is an index i such that ∃yT (i, x, y) binumerates Z in Q. Reason in the
consistent theory T +Rn(e, e, i) ∧ ∃!zR(e, e, z):
If ξ(x), Rn(e, e, z) ∧ ∃yT (z, x, y) for some z. But z is unique and
Rn(e, e, i) , so ∃yT (i, x, y).
Since Rn(e, e, i), ξ(x) follows from ∃yT (i, x, y) by ∃-introduction.
Hence the theory T + ∀x(ξ(x) ↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) is consistent. If k ∈ Y , then
T ⊢ ∃yT (i, k, y), so T+∀x(ξ(x) ↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) ⊢ ξ(k), and similarly for k /∈ Y .
Since the consistent theory T+ ∀x(ξ(x)↔ ∃yT (i, x, y)) proves all the sentences
in Y , so T+Y is consistent. By compactness, it follows that T+X is consistent,
and therefore ξ(x) is independent over T.
The Go¨del-Rosser incompleteness theorem now follows directly from the re-
sult above. While the generalisation to arithmetically definable fragments is
new, the basic idea of this proof is due to Kripke [22, Corollary 1.1], who used it
to rederive Mostowski’s result from his own theorem on the existence of flexible
formulae. Here, we understand flexibility in the following sense:
Definition. A formula γ(x) is flexible for Γ over T if, for every δ(x) ∈ Γ, the
theory T + ∀x(γ(x)↔ δ(x)) is consistent.
The definitions used by Kripke obscure the original content of his theorem,
but in hindsight his proof yields that for every consistent, r.e. extension T of
I∆0 + exp, there is a Σn+1 formula that is flexible for Σn+1 over T. Striving
for some unification, we derive an hierarchical version of Kripke’s theorem by
generalising a result of Lindstro¨m’s [24, Proposition 2]; which in turn is a gener-
alisation of both Mostowski’s and Kripke’s results, as well as of Scott’s famous
lemma used to realise countable Scott sets as standard systems of models of PA
[36].
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Theorem 3. Let T be a Σn+1-definable extension of I∆0 + exp. For every Σm
formula φ(x) with m ≥ n, there is a Σm+1 formula γ(x) such that for every
g ∈ ω2, if
Tg = T + {φ(k)
g(k) : k ∈ ω}
is Σn-sound, then γ(x) is flexible for Σm+1 over Tg.
Proof. Fix n and let φ(x) ∈ Σm, with m ≥ n. Let f(s, η) = σ iff s is binary
sequence of length k such that
σ(x) ∈ Σm+1 and T + φ(0)
(s)0 + · · ·+ ∧φ(k)(s)k ⊢ ¬∀x(η(x)↔ σ(x)).
Minimise, first on the Go¨del number of σ(x), then on the Go¨del number of s
to make sure that f is well-defined. Then f is recursive in ∅(n) by Fact 3. Let
Seqφ(x) be the formula
∀y < l(x)((φ(y)→ (x)y = 0) ∧ (¬φ(y)→ (x)y = 1)),
where l(x) denotes the length of s. Whenever φ(x) is Σm, Seqφ(x) is ∆m+1. Let,
by Fact 16, e be an n-index for f and let, by Fact 5, γ(x) be a Σm+1 formula
such that
T ⊢ ∀x(γ(x)↔ ∃s∃z(Seqφ(s) ∧R
n(e, s, pγq, z)∧ SatΣn+1(z, x))).
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is a g ∈ ω2 such that Tg is Σn-sound,
but Tg + ∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)) is inconsistent for some σ(x) ∈ Σm+1. Then there is
a shortest finite initial subsequence s of g such that
T + φ(0)(s)0 + · · ·+ φ(k)(s)k ⊢ ¬∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)).
But then, by construction, f(s, γ) = σ, and by Fact 4,
T + ThΣn+1(N) ⊢ R
n(e, s, pγq, pσq)∧ ∃!z(Rn(e, s, pγq, z)).
By choice of s, Tg ⊢ Seqφ(s), so Tg + ThΣn+1(N) ⊢ ∀x(γ(x) ↔ σ(x)) by an
argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 2. Then Tg + ThΣn+1(N) is
inconsistent, contradicting the assumption that Tg was Σn-sound.
By choosing φ(x) as a decidable formula in the construction above, we obtain
the expected hierarchical version of Kripke’s theorem:
Corollary (Blanck [2, Theorem 4.8]). Let T be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound
extension of I∆0 + exp. For all m ≥ n, there is a Σm+1 formula γ(x) that is
flexible for Σm+1 over T.
Mostowski’s theorem for extensions of I∆0+exp then follows immediately by
using the method described in the proof of Theorem 2. A similar argument also
yields Scott’s lemma. Our next step is to show how the hierarchical version of
Kripke’s theorem can be formalised in IΣn+1. The proof is a minor modification
of an argument of Blanck [2, Theorem 5.1].
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Theorem 4. Let S be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound extension of IΣn+1, and let
T be a Σn+1-definable extension of Q. For all m ≥ n, there is a Σm+1 formula
γ(x) such that:
1. S ⊢ ConT,Σn+1 → ∀x¬γ(x);
2. if σ(x) ∈ Σm+1, then, every model of S+ConT,Σn+1 has a Σn-elementary
extension to a model of T+ ∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)).
Proof. Fix n, and let φ(x, z) be the Σn+1 formula PrT,Σn+1(p¬R
n(x˙, x˙, z˙)q). Let
e be the Go¨del number of φ(x, z).
By construction of φ(x, z) we have
S ⊢ ∀z(Rn(e, e, z)→ PrT,Σn+1(p¬R
n(e, e, z˙)q)), (1)
and by Fact 7
S ⊢ ∀z(Rn(e, e, z)→ PrT,Σn+1(pR
n(e, e, z˙)q)). (2)
Then (1) and (2) together with Fact 8 give
S ⊢ ∀z(ConT,Σn+1 → ¬R
n(e, e, z)). (3)
Observe that
S ⊢ ∃z¬ConT,Σn+1+Rn(e,e,z) ↔ ∃zPrT,Σn+1(pR
n(e, e, z˙)q), (4)
which by construction of φ(x, z) together with Fact 17 give
S ⊢ ∃z¬ConT,Σn+1+Rn(e,e,z) ↔ ∃zR
n(e, e, z). (5)
Together with (3), this implies
S ⊢ ∀z(ConT,Σn+1 → ConT,Σn+1+Rn(e,e,z)). (6)
We claim that the Σm+1 formula γ(x) := ∃z(Rn(e, e, z) ∧ SatΣm+1(z, x)) is
as desired. Let M be any model of S + ConT,Σn+1 . Then the first part of the
theorem follows directly from (3).
For the latter part, let σ(x) be any Σm+1 formula; then by (6), we imme-
diately get M |= ConT,Σn+1+Rn(e,e,pσq). Since T is Σn+1-definable and S is
Σn-sound, Fact 6 implies that T + ThΣn+1(M) + R
n(e, e, pσq) is Σn+1(M)-
definable. By Fact 10, there is an end-extension K of M that satisfies T +
ThΣn+1(M) + R
n(e, e, pσq). Since SSy(M) = SSy(K) and, by construction,
ThΣn+1(M) ⊆ ThΣn+1(K), Fact 12 ensures that M is embeddable as a Σn-
elementary initial segment of K. Since K satisfies Rn(e, e, pσq), it follows that
K |= ∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)), as desired.
Corollary. For each σ(x) ∈ Σn+1, with γ(x) as above, T+∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)) is
Πn+1-conservative over T + ConT,Σn+1 .
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Our next theorem has a different flavour than the earlier ones, and is a
generalisation of Woodin’s theorem on the universal algorithm [41]; see also
[3, Theorem 3.1]. A version for r.e. extensions of PA is independently due to
Hamkins [17, Theorem 17], and the proof presented here uses a method that I
learned from Shavrukov.
Theorem 5. Let T be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound extension of IΣn+1. There
is an Σn+1-definable set We such that:
1. IΣn+1 ⊢ ConT,Σn+1 →We = ∅;
2. for each countable model M |= T, if s is an M-finite set such that M |=
We ⊆ s, then there is a Σn-elementary extension ofM satisfying T+We =
s.
Proof. We use the formalisation of Fact 14 in IΣn+1 to define the desired set
We in stages. At the same time, an auxiliary function r(x) is defined.
Stage 0: Set We,0 = ∅, and r(0) =∞.1
Stage x+ 1: Suppose r(x) = m. There are two cases:
Case A: s ⊇ We,x, k < m, and x witnesses a Σn+1 sentence σ(s)
such that k is a proof in T+ThΣn+1(N) of ∀t(σ(t)→We 6= t). Then
set We,x+1 = s and r(x + 1) = k;
Case B: otherwise, set We,x+1 = We,x and r(x + 1) = m.
Let We =
⋃
xWe,x.
Since provability in T+ThΣn+1(N) is Σn+1, We is r.e. in ∅
(n), and therefore
Σn+1 by Fact 3. Provably in IΣn+1, we have thatWe,x+1 ⊇We,x, and r(x+1) ≤
r(x), so by the Σn+1-least number principle, there is a limit R = limx r(x).
For each x with We,x+1 6=We,x, IΣn+1 proves r(x+1) < r(x), whence there
can only be finitely many such x. So IΣn+1 ⊢ “We is finite”.
Note that T ⊢ R > k for all k ∈ ω. To show this, fix k ∈ ω and argue in T:
Suppose R ≤ k. Let y be minimal such that r(y + 1) = R. Then
We = We,y+1 = s for some s such that R is a proof in T+ThΣn+1(N)
of ∀t(σ(t)→We 6= t), where σ(s) is a true Σn+1 sentence.
But, by Fact 9,
since ∀t(σ(t)→ We 6= t) is proved from true Σn+1-sentences with a
proof not exceeding k, it must be true. Since σ(s) is true, We 6= s is
also true, and the contradiction proves R > k.
To prove (1), argue for the contrapositive statement in IΣn+1:
If We = s 6= ∅, then Pr
m
T (p∀t(σ(t) → We 6= t)q) for some m. Since
We is finite, s ⊆ We is Σn+1. Then PrT,Σn+1(ps ⊆ Weq) follows by
Fact 7. Now reason inside PrT,Σn+1 :
1Here ∞ is a formal symbol that by definition is greater than all the natural numbers.
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There is some u = We with u ⊇ s, so by construction, σ(u)
is true, and PrkT(p∀t(σ(t)→We 6= t)q) for some k ≤ m.
Apply Fact 9, and continue reasoning inside PrT,Σn+1 :
Then ∀t(σ(t)→We 6= t) and σ(u), so We 6= u.
Then PrT,Σn+1(p∃u(We = u∧We 6= u)q), so Fact 8 gives ¬ConT,Σn+1
as desired.
To prove (2), first fix m ∈ ω. By Fact 17, there is a proof k in T of
∀t(PrmT,Σn+1(pWe 6= t˙q)→We 6= t).
Now reason in T:
Consider any finite s ⊇We, and suppose x is a proof ≤ m of We 6= s
in T +ThΣn+1(N). Then s ⊇We,x+1, and therefore r(x+ 1) ≤ k by
construction of r(x+1): here PrmT,Σn+1(pWe 6= sq) is a true sentence
playing the role of σ(s). But k ≤ R < r(x+1), and the contradiction
proves ConmT,Σn+1+We=s.
Let M be any countable model of T. Since T is Σn+1-definable and Σn-
sound, Facts 6 and 11 imply that T + ThΣn+1(M) +We = s ∈ SSy(M). Since
T ⊢ ConmT,Σn+1+We=s for all m ∈ ω, the theorem now follows using Fact 13.
Corollary. With T as above, ¬ConT,Σn+1 is Πn+1-conservative over T.
Proof. Every countable model of T has a Σn-elementary extension satisfying
We 6= ∅, and therefore T + ¬ConT,Σn+1 by the theorem. By Fact 13, the
conclusion follows.
The final theorem is of a more Kripkean variety, and improves on Theorem
7.21 of [2] by generalising to arithmetically definable theories. A version for r.e.
extensions of PA is independently due to Hamkins [17, Theorem 21(1)], who
also noted that there is a very short proof of it from Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. Let T be a Σn+1-definable, Σn-sound extension of IΣn+1. For all
m ≥ n, there is a Σm+2 formula γ(x) such that:
1. IΣn+1 ⊢ ConT,Σn+1 → ∀x¬γ(x);
2. for every σ(x) ∈ Σm+2, every countable model of T has a Σn-elementary
extension satisfying T+ ∀x(γ(x)↔ σ(x)).
Proof. Let We be as in Theorem 5, and let λ(z) be a Σn+2 formula expressing
“z is the latest addition to We”. Let γ(x) be the Σm+2 formula ∃z(λ(z) ∧
SatΣm+2(z, x)).
Pick any σ(x) ∈ Σm+2, and letM be any countable model of T. By Theorem
5, there is a Σn-elementary extension K ofM in which pσq is the latest addition
to We. Then γ(x) coincides with σ(x) in K, and therefore is as desired.
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5 Discussion
The generalisation from “consistent, r.e.” to “Σn-sound, Σn+1-definable” seems
to be very robust. The observation that ¬ConT,Σn+1 is Πn+1-conservative over
Σn-sound T can be taken to corroborate this view, since the case n = 0, in light
of Fact 1, coincides with Kreisel’s observation that ¬ConT is Π1-conservative
over consistent T.
The properties of Σn-soundness and Σn+1-definability seem to go hand in
hand since Σn-soundness of T implies consistency of T + ThΣn+1(N). As this
latter theory is Σn+1-definable, we can freely bump up the complexity of T to
Σn+1 without losing definability, and the addition of all the true Σn+1 sentences
is enough to allow for binumeration of the more complex relations needed to
represent the resulting n-recursive functions that are used in some of the proofs.
The Facts listed in Section 3 should be enough to derive hierarchical gener-
alisations for arithmetically definable fragments of PA of many of the theorems
in, e.g., Lindstro¨m’s classic Aspects of Incompleteness. In fact, I would be inter-
ested to see an example of a result proved in, say, the first 5 chapters of Aspects
(where the results do not depend on T being essentially reflexive) that is not
prone to such a generalisation, using these principles.
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